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It has been said that "[u]ninsured motorists coverage 'is de-
signed to further close the gaps inherent in the motor vehicle finan-
cial responsibility and compulsory insurance legislation.' "29 Such a
"gap" certainly occurs when a motorist, driving a vehicle supposedly
covered by liability insurance, negligently injures another party, in-
sured under uninsured motorists coverage, and the negligent party's
liability insurer refuses to pay the injured party on the ground that
the policy did not cover the vehicle, the driver, or the type of acci-
dent involved. The vehicle involved should then be considered "un-
insured" within the terms of the statute because the liability insurer
has denied coverage, thus enabling the injured party to collect upon
his uninsured motorists coverage. Such a result fits the judicially
stated purpose of our statutory scheme of compulsory liability insur-
ance "to provide protection, within the required limits, to persons
injured or damaged by the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle .... 30
If a vehicle is uninsured when there is no liability policy at all or
when the liability insurer is insolvent, then it should be uninsured
when the liability insurer will not pay. The effect in each instance
is to deprive the injured person of the protection afforded by liability
insurance contrary to the principle of protection for all innocent
motorists provided by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Act.
PENDER R. McELROY
Labor Law-Collective Bargaining-Is the Court Replacing
the Union
Labor-management disputes in railroad operations are regulated
by the Railway Labor Act.1 It provides for negotiation,2 media-
tion,3 voluntary arbitration,4 and fact finding.5 However, the ulti-
" Buck v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 265 N.C. 285, 288, 144 S.E.2d
34, 36 (1965).
"0 Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 126, 116 S.E.2d 482,
487 (1960).
144 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1964).264 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (1964).
S78 Stat. 748, 45 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
'48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
63 Stat. 107 (1949), 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964).
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mate weapon of "self-help" 6 is preserved. Management is permitted
to hire replacements, make unilateral thanges, 7 and the unions can
strike. But in a nationwide emergency, Congress can and has sub-
stituted compulsory arbitration for self-help in a labor dispute.'
The ultimate form of union self-help is the right to strike, but
it is not without limitations. Strikes such as "sit-downs"9 and
"mutinies"' 0 are prohibited. Furthermore, if the strike is for eco-
nomic reasons, the jobs of strikers are forfeited if permanent strike
replacements are hired."
The employer, as well, may resort to self-help when good faith
collective bargaining fails. 2 He may hire strike replacements to
keep his business operative 3 or "shut-down"' 4 at a time of his own
choosing. But here again limitations are imposed. Employer sym-
pathy lock-outs 5 and super seniority privileges' 6 are examples of
prohibited measures.
The availability of self-help however, does not terminate the
bargaining relationship. It is still unlawful for the employer to
make unilateral changes in terms of conditions of employment and
he must negotiate with the union in regards to pay rates and work-
ing conditions of strike replacements.'
The recent case of Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida
East Coast Ry.'8 represents an inroad into the aforementioned labor-
management concepts of self-help, at least in the context of railroad
' See note 27 infra.
TIn NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), the
employer hired replacements to operate his business and was not required to
discharge them on return of the participants in an economic strike.
'E.g., Act of Aug. 28, 1963, 77 Stat. 132, in which Congress provided
for a special arbitration board to establish conditions that would be in effect
for a two-year period, thus avoiding a threatened nationwide railroad union
strike. See Brief for Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen as
Appellant, pp. 4-5, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineman v.
Bangor & Aroostock R.R., - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1966).
'E.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
1 "See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
"1 See note 7 supra.
1 See note 27 infra.
" Note 7 supra.
" American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
1" See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), for the proposition that a
lockout based on hostility to the process of collective bargaining would be
illegal.
18 See note 37 infra.
1 See note 36 infra.
18384 U.S. 238 (1966).
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operations. The labor unions,"' on behalf of nonoperating employ-
ees,2 0 demanded a general twenty-five-cents-per-hour wage increase
and six months notice of prospective lay-offs and job terminations.
This demand was made of virtually all Class One railroads, includ-
ing the defendant.
Pursuant to the Railway Labor Act negotiation and mediation
ensued but no agreement was reached. A presidential emergency
board 1 was then created to conduct hearings and make settlement
recommendations. Its efforts were successful with respect to all rail-
roads concerned except Florida East Coast.
Subsequent to the failure.of defendant and the unions to come
to terms, the latter struck and defendant hired replacement work-
ers.22 In so doing, new contracts that were at variance with the
existing collective agreements in respect to wages and notice were
negotiated with the replacements. Florida East Coast further at-
tempted to nullify the previous union-negotiated agreements by sub-
stituting new contracts that embodied additional departures. These
were foreign to the union agreements in particulars other than those
that were the initial subject of dispute. The new agreements were
challenged by the United States as violative of the Railway Labor
Act.2 3 The ensuing litigation resulted in a decision that the railroad
The unions referred to are a group of eleven cooperating labor organi-
zations representing workers employed by the railroad. Brief for Petitioner,
p. 4 .
" Employees in "so-called non-operating crafts-clerks, machinists, etc."
Id. at 4 n.1.
" § 160, providing for the board, states in part:
If a dispute between a carrier and its employees be not adjusted under
the foregoing provisions of this chapter and should, in the judgment
of the Mediation Board, threaten substantially to interrupt interstate
commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country
of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify
the President, who may thereupon, in his discretion, create a board
to investigate and report respecting such dispute....
After the creation of such board and for thirty days after such
board has made its report to the President, no change, except by
agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the
conditions out of which the dispute arose.
48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
12 For a time, the railroad ceased operations altogether as a result of the
strike. This was prior to the hiring of the replacements in question.
"The segment of the act in question was 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45
U.S.C. § 152, Seventh (1964) which provides:
No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in
agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or
in section 156 of this title.
1967]
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had violated the act by this unilateral action. But it was held that
the railroad could institute changes if they were first submitted to a
court and found to be "reasonably necessary to effectuate its rights
to continue to run its railroad under the strike conditions."24 This
in effect, opened the way for defendant to secure proposed con-
tractual changes by court approval without resorting to further
negotiation with the union. Such changes could encompass areas
that had not heretofore been the subject of a union-management
dispute.25
The Supreme Court approved this approach, including the "rea-
sonably necessary" criteria enunciated by the lower court. The union
contended that the only changes Florida East Coast could legiti-
mately make in formulating the replacement worker agreements
were those that had previously been submitted to negotiation as
required by the act. This proposition was rejected on the basis that
if the mediation procedure was invoked for every individual change
deemed necessary during a strike, the carrier would be crippled. In
addition, the Court felt that the union proposal would prevent the
48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964) provides;
Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least
thirty days' written notice of an intended change in agreements affect-
ing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and place
for the beginning of conference between the representatives of the
parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon within
ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within
the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice
of intended change has been given, or conferences are being held
with reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have
been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its ser-
vices, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered
by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon, as
required by section 155 of this title, by the Mediation Board, unless
a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences
without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board.
' Florida East Coast Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d
172, 182 (5th Cir. 1964). Subsequent to this decision the district court
allowed the alterations enumerated in note 25 infra. This was affirmed in
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry., 348 F.2d 682
(5th Cir. 1965) and precipitated the present holding.
" The district court had permitted Florida East Coast:
to exceed the ratio of apprentices to journeymen and age limitations
established by the collective bargaining agreement to contract out
certain work, and to use supervisory personnel to perform specified
jobs where it appeared that trained personnel were unavailable.
384 U.S. at 243.
It must be remembered that the subject of the original negotiations was
wages and notice. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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railroad from making a "reasonable effort"20 to continue operations
during the strike and thereby constitute a breach of public duty on
the part of the carrier. In fact, the duty of the railroad to the
public appeared to be the Court's major concern. It discussed the
potential disaster of a general shutdown of service and stated that
the carrier's right of self-help17 would be meaningless if the already
cumbersome negotiation procedure was extended.
Given that the public interest in uninterrupted carrier service is
substantial and that the present ruling will protect that interest, what
of the public interest in the protection of organized labor? It is
submitted that Congress was well aware of the vital nature of rail-
way transportation at the time the act was passed." As the right
to strike was not prohibited, it would seem that union equities were
considered a substantial public interest. Moreover, as pointed out
by the dissent of Mr. Justice White, the act does not call for com-
pulsory arbitration of disputes,2 9 a measure that would virtually
insure continued carrier operation in the face of labor-management
disagreements. In addition, there is no absolute duty on the carrier
to continue service; only a reasonable effort is required.30 Thus it
is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to negate the
effectiveness of a strike where the railroad is concerned, though ad-
mittedly desiring to encourage settlements by protracted negotiation
procedures in hopes that a strike would be unnecessary.
Although it is uncertain what contractual changes a court may
find "reasonably necessary" in a particular fact situation, the poten-
o The Court did not consider the duty of the carrier to operate absolute,
but stated that the railroad:
owes the public reasonable efforts to maintain public service at all
times, even when beset by labor-management controversies and that
this duty continues even when all the mediation provisions of the Act
have been exhausted and self-help becomes available to both sides
of the labor-management controversy.
Id. at 245.
7 The Court referred to Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Balti-
more & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963), as authority for the proposition
that self-help is available to both parties to a dispute when statutory pro-
cedures have failed to result in settlement. 384 U.S. at 244. Of course, the
strike is the union method of exercising this right.
28 May 20, 1926 was the date of initial enactment.
" It provides for voluntary arbitration but specifically states, "The failure
or refusal of either party to submit a controversy to arbitration shall not
be construed as a violation of any legal obligation imposed upon such party
by the terms of this chapter or otherwise." 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45
U.S.C. § 157, First (1964).
"0 See note 26 supra.
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tial danger to union bargaining power is significant. As the purpose
of a strike is application of economic pressure to management, it
must hamper management activity to be of any consequence. As-
suming that a railroad is able to convince a court that sweeping
changes are necessary to effectively operate under strike conditions,
the inconvenience of changing personnel might be the single major
obstacle that management would face. Any expense incurred thereby
would be overshadowed by the pecuniary consequences of yielding
to substantial union demands for wage increases and alterations of
working conditions.
The knowledge that collective agreements that were in effect
prior to the strike would remain the standard contracts and return
to prominence at the conclusion of the dispute"' would be little con-
solation from the union viewpoint. As dissatisfaction with existing
arrangements is the primary motive for strikes, a return to the same
would not justify the effort. In fact, labor would suffer more than
management as participating rank and file would be unemployed
during the strike while management continues to function with rela-
tive ease. The mere prospect of such an occurrence will constitute
a deterrent to union activity, though in the final analysis a court
may not agree that management demands were "reasonably neces-
sary."
As to enforcement of this "reasonably necessary" standard, the
Court in this case stated that it must be strictly construed and:
The carrier must respect the continuing status of the collective
bargaining agreement and make only those changes as are truly
necessary in light of the inexperience and lack of training of the
new labor force or the lesser number of employees available for
the continued operation.3 2,
It is submitted that the above does not constitute a standard that
is susceptible of strict construction. The necessities, as seen by a
court faced with such determination, will depend upon various fac-
tual issues that may not fit into a neat pattern. Moreover, the
language quoted would seem to indicate a balance in favor of the
collective agreements that a carrier must overcome.33 But consider-
1 The collective agreements were to constitute the basic framework upon
which the court approved changes would be tacked. See note 33 infra.32384 U.S. at 248.
"The Court stated that "the burden is on the carrier to show the need
for any alteration . . . that it is required to employ in order to maintain
that continuity of operation that the law requires of it." Id. at 248.
[Vol. 45
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ing the Court's emphasis on the plight of the railroad undertaking
"to keep its vital services going with a substantially different labor
force,"34 the balance disappears. The carrier will be operating with
a substantially different labor force in every strike situation where
contractual changes are sought. Furthermore, it is unlikely that re-
placements, as a group, will ever have the training and railroad orien-
tation of employees for whose benefit the collective agreements were
tailored.35 Thus the union is faced with the prospect of management
having a built-in argument in support of its contentions.
If wholesale changes do result from such a process, what of the
right of the union "to represent all employees in the craft irregard-
less of union membership"3 as enunciated by the Court? This
phrase is without substance if the union is unable to make a showing
of strength during the crucial strike period. Such showing would be
evidenced by a continued adherence to existing collective agreements.
With the railroad now able to appeal to the courts for extensive
alteration of these agreements, can it be said that union representa-
tion is not thereby undermined ?
84 Id. at 245.
" The Court emphasized that the qualifications of replacements are un-
likely to blend with "the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, drafted
to meet the sophisticated requirements of a trained and professional labor
force." Id. at 246.
"' The Court refers to Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944) in which it was stated:
The labor organization chosen to be the representative of the craft
or class of employees is thus chosen to represent all of its members,
regardless of their union affiliations or want of them.... The purpose
of providing for a representative is to secure those benefits for those
who are represented and not to deprive them or any of them of the
benefits of collective bargaining for the advantage of the representa-
tive or those members of the craft who selected it.
Id. at 200-01.
" In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), replacement
workers hired during a strike were given "20 years additional seniority
. . . which would be available only for credit against future layoffs and
which could not be used for other employee benefits based on years of
service." Id. at 223. The same benefits were accorded strikers who re-
turned to work.
The Court evidenced concern for continuing union strength in strike
situations by declaring the seniority gambit an unfair labor practice. In
regard to management claims that such action was taken in pursuit of legiti-
mate business purposes, the Court stated:
Nevertheless, his conduct does speak for itself-it is discriminating
and it does discourage union membership and whatever the claimed
overriding justification may be, it carries with it unavoidable conse-
quences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have
intended.
1967]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, it is far from certain that the effect of the present
holding will be confined to union activity within the purview of the
Railway Labor Act. Neither the Court38 nor the National Labor
Relations Board39 has hesitated to cite cases involving the act as
authority in otherwise unrelated areas of labor law. Thus the in-
stant decision may serve as precedent for similar appeals in other
industries, especially if they are found to be charged with a public
duty.
But regardless of future expansion, it is submitted that the
instant case creates an imbalance ° in the railway labor process that
unions are unlikely to overcome.41 If taking such a step is truly
necessary to maintain the vital function of carrier operations in the
present economic complex, it would seem to be a congressional
rather than judicial prerogative.
WILLIAm H. FAULK, JR.
Real Property-Discontinuance of Dedicated Streets-
Disposition of Property
Having been established by dedication, a street retains its status
as a public way until it is discontinued in a manner provided by law.'
Generally, statutes provide that streets may legally cease to exist
Id. at 228. In light of the Court's reasoning, should conduct that dis-
courages union membership be treated differently if the employer is able to
secure the approval of a lower court? This situation may arise in various
areas of labor law if the Florida East Coast decision is not limited to the
confines of the Railway Labor Act. For a consideration of such possibility
see note 39 infra and the accompanying text.
"E.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Intl Union, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955),
rev'd and remanded per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1956), in which the Supreme
Court cited Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) as
authority for reversing the lower court finding of "no jurisdiction" in a
racial discrimination case against the unions.
" E.g., Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1966), in which the board
cited Steele as authority for application of the duty of fair representation
in labor law.
o For the proposition that a balancing process is in order, i.e. weighing
the right to strike against the right of the employer to maintain his busi-
ness, see NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
"Mr. Justice White considered the majority opinion "very close to a
judgment that there shall be no strikes in the transportation business, a
judgment which Congress rejected in drafting the Railway Labor Act." 384
U.S. at 250.
1 11 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL COPPORATIONS § 30.182, at 101 (3d ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLAN].
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